Abstract-Security is an important aspect for the future wireless networks. Since the number of network nodes increases constantly, and, in addition, the networks are decentralized and adhoc in nature, it becomes more challenging to apply the current cryptographic methods that require exchange of keys between the communicating parties. Information-theoretic secrecy is an emerging security field that explores the possibility of achieving perfect secrecy data transmission between the intended network nodes, while possible malicious nodes (also called eavesdroppers) are kept ignorant of the transmitted information. In other words, that is the ability of the physical layer to provide security (beside the reliability) of the transmitted (broadcasted) data. For that reason, it is often called physical layer security. In this paper we observe how a simple cooperative network with one relay node can improve the physical layer security by decreasing the area in which the eavesdropper can reside and listen to the information transmitted to the destination. This region is called vulnerability region and we provide its characterization. Under certain conditions, the vulnerability region vanishes, which makes our wireless system perfectly secure for any position of the eavesdropper within the wireless network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic secrecy is a concept initially introduced by Shannon [1] . Wyner defined the wiretap channel and established the possibility to create almost perfect secure communication links without relying on exchange of private keys [2] . He showed that when the channel between the source and the eavesdropper, called eavesdropper channel is weaker than the channel between the source and the destination, called main channel, the source and the destination can exchange perfectly secure messages at a positive rate. At the same time the eavesdropper is not able to receive any information. In that case, we say that the secrecy capacity is positive. In other words, a maximal level of secrecy is obtained. By ensuring that the equivocation rate is arbitrarily close to the message rate, one can achieve perfect secrecy in the sense that the eavesdropper is now limited to learn almost nothing about the source-destination messages from its observations. Follow-up work by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [3] characterized the secrecy capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) wiretap channel. In their landmark paper, Csiszár and Körner [4] generalized Wyner's approach by considering the This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway through the projects 176773/S10 entitled "Optimized Heterogeneous Multiuser MIMO Networks (OptiMO)" and 183311/S10 entitled "Mobile-to-Mobile Communication Systems (M2M). transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels. Recently, there have been considerable efforts on generalizing these studies to the wireless channel and multi-user scenarios (see [5] - [12] and references therein).
A model for the relay channel was introduced and studied in the pioneering works by van der Meulen [13] - [15] . Substantial advances in the theory were made by Cover and El Gamal [16] , who developed two fundamental coding strategies for the relay channel. A combination of these strategies achieves capacities for several classes of degraded memoryless relay channels. Most of the work done so far was related to memoryless relay channels with or without feedback. Usually, the research related to relay channels is aimed at the increase of the transmission data rate. Lai and El Gamal [17] studied the relayeavesdropper channel, and they proposed a new method called noise-forwarding strategy. In [18] , we study how cooperation with multiple relays can improve the information theoretic security. There, we introduce the vulnerability region and its surface as a measure of how secret a given cooperative network is. In addition, we study the bounds of the surface as a function of the number of cooperating relays.
In this paper, we characterize the vulnerability region in a single relay cooperative wireless network. Cooperation improves the physical layer security in the network by minimizing the area in which the secrecy capacity is zero. We realize that under certain conditions, this area, called vulnerability region, vanishes. In other words, in this case, we have a perfectly secure system and no matter where the eavesdroppers reside, they will not be able to receive any information intended to the desired destination. This will be possible by carefully designed codes that achieve the secrecy capacity and without any key exchange. The improvement in the security is achieved by increasing the capacity of the direct channel by the help of the relay, as well as decreasing the capacity of the eavesdropper channel by introducing interference (jamming) from the relay and the source. The cooperation by jamming was previously studied in [17] and [19] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the system model is described, while in Section III, the characterization of the vulnerability region is provided. The conditions for which a perfect secrecy system can be obtained are discussed in Section IV, and the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Observe the four node relay-eavesdropper network in Fig. 1 . There is a source node that transmits data to a destination node, while there is a malicious node (eavesdropper) that "listens" to the transmitted information. In the following, we will use the words eavesdropper and malicious node interchangeably. There is a single relay in the network that cooperates with the source by relaying the transmitted data and, hence, increasing the information-theoretic secrecy. We consider the standard Gaussian channel in which the channel coefficients are determined by the distance between the corresponding nodes raised to the negative power of the path loss coefficient β. The direct channel is represented by the standard relay channel
Here, Y d and Y r are the received signals at the destination and the relay nodes, respectively, while, X s and X r are the transmitted signals from the source and the relay nodes, respectively. There is a power constraint on the transmitted signals from the source node
and from the relay node
The fading coefficients are determined only by the distance between the transmitting and the receiving nodes, such that the ratio of the received power at node B and the transmitted power from node A is given by d
−β
B,A and β is the path loss coefficient. A more realistic model should include the random fading, however, in that case the whole analysis is getting more demanding. Here, we decided to consider only the simple attenuation due to the path loss, in order to get some initial ideas about the structure of the secrecy region. Both channels in (1) have complex additive Gaussian noise, represented by Z d and Z r , having zero mean and unit variances.
The malicious node observes signals from both, the source and the relay and can receive part of their signals. Similarly as in [18] , we assume that the source and the relay are smart enough to use part of their available power to introduce Gaussian interference at the malicious node. Hence, the received signal at the malicious node is represented by
where by the coefficients q and k we model how perfectly the malicious node can listen to the source and the relay. We call q a source synchronization coefficient and k a relay synchronization coefficient.
means that the malicious node is perfectly synchronized with the source (relay) and q = 0 (k = 0) means that the malicious node cannot receive anything from the source (relay). The additive Gaussian noise at the malicious node Z m has zero mean and variance
That means, beside the thermal noise with unit variance the source and the relay introduce some interference using part of their powers. The interference introduced by the source is generated by some portion of its power, that is aP s . Here, a ∈ [0, 1] is called source interference coefficient and naturally, a + q ≤ 1. Similarly, bP r is the portion of the relay power that is used to "disturb" the malicious node, where
We assume that the positions of the source, the relay, and the destination are fixed. In that case the secrecy capacity will depend on the location of the malicious node. The secrecy capacity of this cooperative system with a single relay is given by
where C is the capacity of the main channel between the source and the destination, and C m is the capacity of the eavesdropper channel. Note that in this paper, the secrecy capacity is used in a weak manner defined by (4) . In this case, the capacity of the main channel C will be the capacity of the relay channel. The capacity of the relay channel is not known, but here we do not need to use a particular expression for it, since we will analyze the vulnerability regions as a function of C. Since the secrecy capacity depends on the location of the malicious node, we may consider it as a function in the two dimensional plane, if without loss of generality we put the source at the origin and the destination node at the point
Without loss of generality, the location of the relay node is (x r , 0), x r ∈ R, meaning d r,s = x r . Also, without loss of generality, we may assume that the relay node and the destination node are always to the right of the source node, or in other words, x r > 0 and x d > 0. In that case, the secrecy capacity will be a function of the location of the malicious node (x m , y m ).
In order to proceed to the analysis, we use the following definitions, introduced in [18] .
Definition 1: The geometrical area (region) in which the secrecy capacity is positive is called secrecy region.
Therefore, the secrecy region is
Definition 2: The geometrical area (region) in which the secrecy capacity vanishes is called vulnerability region.
Hence, the vulnerability region is
The goal is to minimize the vulnerability region which is equivalent to maximizing the secrecy region. In the rest of the paper, we characterize the vulnerability region. It is in our interest to determine under which conditions it is minimal.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE VULNERABILITY REGION
In this section, we analyze the shape of the vulnerability region, which is the region in which if any malicious node resides, the communication between the source and the destination is not secret.
To start the analysis, note that by definition the secrecy capacity if a malicious node resides in the vulnerability region. In that case, within the vulnerability region, since C s = 0, we have
From our assumptions, the malicious node receives information from both, the source and the relay, while at the same time the interference is coming from both of them as well. In that case, from (2) and (3) we have
Hence, an alternative representation of the vulnerability region would be
For convenience we can also express it as
and we switch to polar coordinates (r, ϕ) for the location of the malicious node. Moreover, since x m = r cos ϕ and y m = r sin ϕ we have
r − 2x r r cos ϕ. That means the vulnerability region is given by the polar coordinates
Depending on the sign of c 1 and c 2 , we observe four different cases.
Case 1: c 1 ≤ 0 and c 2 ≤ 0. In this case, since r −β and (r 2 + x 2 r − 2x r r cos ϕ) −β/2 are positive, it is straightforward that the vulnerability region vanishes. We shall see later that this is the only case for which the vulnerability region vanishes for any r and ϕ. Hence, this is the preferred case.
Case 2: c 1 ≤ 0 and c 2 > 0. From (10) we have
Hence, the vulnerability region is obtained as the union of the following two regions 
That gives
Therefore, the vulnerability region is obtained as the union of the following two regions 
Note that Case 3 is equivalent to Case 2. We describe it here just for completeness with respect to (10) . It is obvious that if we change the coordinate system and place the origin where the relay is, we shall get exactly the same results as in Case 2. Different shapes of the vulnerability region for c 1 > 0 and c 2 ≤ 0 (Case 3) are shown in Fig. 2 . Here, β = 3 and x r = 0.8. The source node is represented by a square at the origin, the relay node by a star and the shaded region around the source node is the vulnerability region. If the malicious node stays in this region the secrecy capacity is zero, i.e., secret communication at non-zero rate between the source and the destination is not possible. The shapes for Case 2 are exactly the same if the source and the relay change their places. We notice different shapes for different values of c 1 and c 2 . 
Then, the vulnerability region is obtained as a union of the following three sets
and
That gives
Different shapes of the vulnerability region for c 1 > 0 and c 2 > 0 (Case 4) are observed in Fig. 3 for β = 3 and x r = 0.8. The geometry of the vulnerability region is completely described for all possible values of c 1 and c 2 . In the following section we discuss most interesting case where the vulnerability region is zero, i.e., we have a perfect informationtheoretic secrecy system. 
IV. PERFECT SECRECY SYSTEM
From the previous analysis, we observe that if the coefficients c 1 and c 2 are negative, the system will be perfectly secure for any position of the eavesdropper. The values of c 1 and c 2 depend on the transmit powers of the source and the relay, the capacity of the direct channel and the synchronization and interference coefficients of the source and the relay. In order to determine in which case both c 1 and c 2 are negative, we observe (9) and we find C > max log 2 
Since log(·) is a continuous and increasing function and all coefficients are positive we may rewrite (14) that
This tells us that if the coefficients q, a, k, and b are given, a perfect information-theoretic secrecy is guaranteed if the capacity of the relay channel is larger than the right hand side of (15) .
In the following text we consider the special cases a = 1−q and b = 1 − k. Then, we get
Note, however that in reality the synchronization coefficients will depend on the proximity of the malicious node to the source and the relay node. An appropriate model for that is needed. In [18] , two models for the synchronization coefficients are discussed. In Model 1 or the exponential model,
In Model 2 or the Gaussian model,
If Model 1 is used, from (16), we get a perfectly secure system if the malicious node is located such that
If Model 2 is used, a perfectly secure system is obtained if
Geometrically, this is a region outside of the union of the two circles centered at the source and the relay locations. The radii R of these circles are
for Model 1, and 
and for Model 2, it is The corresponding upper bounds on the surface of the vulnerability region are shown in Fig. 4 . Note that for small C, Model 2 behaves better, while Model 1 is better for larger C. For large C, using the Taylor series expansion [20] , ln(1 − 2 −C ) ≈ −2 −C , the bounds (21) and (22) can be approximated as
Note that Model 1 and Model 2, although not realistic models, help us to understand what happens to the vulnerability region if the proximity is important for the malicious node to synchronize with the transmitting source and relay nodes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We characterized the vulnerability region for different parameters of the four node relay-eavesdropper channel. It is shown that the physical layer security of this wireless network can be increased by cooperation. Depending on the capabilities of the malicious node, one could improve the security considerably, by minimizing the vulnerability region. We observe that under certain conditions a perfect information-theoretic secrecy can be achieved by cooperation. In other words, a network with no vulnerability region can be obtained. This depends heavily on the assumed model for the synchronization and interference coefficients. We present an example in which for the earlier proposed Models 1 and 2 we numerically find the upper bound on the surface of the vulnerability region. Although the proposed analysis is for simplified models, we believe it could serve as a solid starting point to study the locations of the cooperating nodes in more complex networks, such that the physical layer security of the entire system is improved.
